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Abstract
This experiment studies the internal and external effects of communication in a multilevel trust game. In this trust game, the first player can send any part of his endowment to the
second player. The amount sent gets tripled. The second player decides how much to send to the
third player. The amount is again tripled, and the third player then decides the allocation among
the three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second
players send significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. When we allow
communication only between the second and third players, the amounts sent and returned
between these two increase. The new interesting finding is that there are external effects of
communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 60% more and receives
140% more than in the no communication treatment. As a result, social welfare and efficiency
increase from 48% to 73%.
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1. Introduction
Trust and reciprocity play important roles in economic interactions. The most frequently
used measure of trust and reciprocity is based on a two-player trust game, proposed by Berg et al.
(1995). In this game, the first player receives an endowment and can send any portion of it to the
second player. The amount sent gets tripled. The second player then decides how much to send
back. The first player is said to be trusting if he sends any positive amount to the second player.
The second player is said to be trustworthy if the amount he returns is at least as great as the
amount he receives (McCabe et al., 2003). Berg et al. (1995), as well as many replications, show
that most participants display trust and trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profitmaximizing behavior (McCabe et al., 1998, 2000, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Burks et al., 2003).
Although there is a substantial variance in the decisions made, a majority of the first players send
positive amounts and a majority of the second players return positive amounts. And the amount
returned is typically increasing in the amount sent.
This study departs from the conventional two-player trust game by providing a
framework for understanding trusting behavior in more complex environments involving direct
and indirect interactions among multiple players. We extend the standard two-player trust game
to a multi-level trust game by adding a third player. The three players move sequentially. The
first player can send any portion of his endowment to the second player. The amount sent gets
tripled. The second player then decides how much to send to the third player. The amount is
again tripled. The third player then decides the allocation among the three players.
The results of our experiment indicate that with no communication some trusting
behavior takes place in the multi-level trust game even though players are randomly regrouped
every period. When we add communication between the second and third players, the amounts
2

sent and returned between these two increase. The new interesting finding is that there are
external effects of communication: the first player who is outside communication sends 60%
more and receives 140% more than in the no communication treatment. As a result, social
welfare and efficiency increase from 48% to 73%. Content analysis of the communication
reveals that what drives the most efficient outcomes are the proposals of equal split among three
players made by either the second or third player. The effect of this type of proposals is strong
enough to overcome tendencies toward collusion between the second and third players.
The multi-level trust game studied in this paper captures both direct and indirect trust and
reciprocity, which are commonly observed in real life. For example, the fund of funds (FoFs)
industry where the manager of a mutual fund company invests in other mutual funds instead of
individual securities has attracted a lot of publicity over the past few years (Gregoriou, 2003;
Nicholas, 2004). Our game closely resembles the FoFs environment where, we have individual
investor who has the opportunity to invest any amount of her endowment in Mutual Fund A.
Manager of Mutual Fund A can invest in another Mutual Fund B any amount of his own
endowment plus the invested amount by individual investors. Manager of Mutual Fund B finally
decides how to allocate the return of total investment among the three parties. Since FoFs
managers are specialized in assessing hedge funds and have access to better information and
better funds, FoFs provide an efficient and cost-effective way for individual investors to access a
diversified group of hedge funds. This efficiency cannot be achieved without FoFs because the
majority of these funds have minimum investment requirements and thus are closed to individual
investors.
The multi-level trust game also allows us to study the internal and external effects of
communication in a group when only a subgroup is allowed to communicate. In the FoFs
example, managers of mutual funds frequently communicate with each other about investments
3

and returns on investments, establishing a “closer relationship”. As a result, a strong possibility
of collusion arises between manager of Mutual Fund A and manger of Mutual Fund B. This
could cause an adverse effect on the level of trust that individual investors might have on
managers. 1 Would communication between managers of mutual funds have any effect on
managerial decisions and investment decisions of individual investors who don’t get the first
hand information about the conversation?2 Our experiment helps to answer these questions. To
examine internal effects of communication, we measure trust and reciprocity among group
members who communicate with each other. To examine the external effects of communication,
we analyze the behavior of those who are left out of the communication.
Our multi-level trust game is related to the three-player centipede game studied by
Rapoport et al. (2003) and Murphy et al. (2004).3 The three-player centipede game is a multistage trust game which can be used to address some aspects of indirect trust (Camerer 2003).
Yet, the strategy space of each player in the three-player centipede game is restricted to a binary
choice, whether to end the game and take some percentage of the available surplus, or to increase
the surplus and allow other players a chance to end the game. Thus, it allows observing only
whether indirect trust exists but not the magnitude of indirect trust. The multi-level trust game
proposed in this study is general enough to capture both the degrees of direct and indirect trust

1

A typical readers’ response from Harvard Professor James Heskett’s column article “Is This the Twilight Era for
the Managed Mutual Fund?” is “As a small individual investor, I feel powerless to control or even understand how
my mutual funds operate. I believe fund managers generally have others' interests, including their own, ahead of
mine. Most importantly, I am skeptical of the ability of fund managers to consistently beat the market”.
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/3825.html
2
Another example of multi-level trust game can be found in the workplace. In some companies, a CEO determines
the bonus for a manager and his workers. When workers decide how much effort to exert, they must not only trust
their manager to report their performance truthfully to the CEO, but also trust that the CEO will reward them
appropriately. It is also often the case that the detailed discussions the CEO and managers have in the board room
are often not revealed to workers or delivered as second hand information via managers to workers.
3
In a repeated three-player centipede game, Rapoport et al. (2003) find that neither full cooperation nor full noncooperation is supported. In a mixed population of human players and robots, Murphy et al. (2004) find that there is
an increase in the propensity of human players to cooperate over time when a handful of cooperative robots are
added while adding a handful of non-cooperative robots does not change the cooperation rate.
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and reciprocity by using a continuous strategy space for each player. Moreover, our game gives
us the flexibility to analyze different communication channels and we focus on the external
effects of communication in this paper which is new to the communication literature.

2. Multi-Level Trust Game
We introduce a new version of a trust game – a multi-level trust game (Figure 2.1). This
is a three-player trust game, where player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 embodies both trustor’s and
trustee’s characteristics, and player 3 always acts as a trustee. All players 1, 2, and 3 are
endowed with e1, e2, and e3. Player 1 can send a portion α12 of his endowment e1 to player 2. The
amount sent by player 1 is multiplied by k1. Then player 2 can send a portion α23 of his total
income to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 is multiplied by factor k2. Then player 3 can
reciprocate to players 1 and 2 by sending back portions of the total money received (α31 > 0 and
α32 > 0), where α32 measures the amount of direct reciprocity and α31 measures the amount of
indirect reciprocity.
Figure 2.1 – Multi-Level Trust Game

2
1

3

The unique Nash equilibrium in the multi-level trust game, which assumes that all players
maximize their earnings, is for all players to send nothing. By backwards induction, player 2
knows that a rational player 3 will not send anything back (α32= α31 =0) and therefore player 2
should send nothing (α23=0). Anticipating this, player 1 should send nothing to player 2 (α12 = 0).
5

In this multilateral setting, if player 1 sends any positive amount (α12 > 0), it means he is willing
to take a risky bet that both players 2 and 3 will reciprocate. In other words, player 1 exhibits
direct trust in player 2 and indirect trust in player 3. It is riskier to trust in this game than in the
two-player game because player 1 is repaid by player 3 and not by player 2. Therefore, player 1
has to trust that player 2 will pass the money to player 3 and also trust that player 3 will be
trustworthy. The most efficient outcome is when both players 1 and 2 fully trust player 3 by
sending all of their endowments.

3. Experimental Design and Hypothesis
We conducted an experiment in which each session had two treatments: a no
communication treatment (NC) and a communication treatment (C). Both treatments lasted for
10 periods. After completing all 20 decision periods, 4 periods were randomly selected for
payment (2 periods for each treatment). In the NC treatment, all subjects were randomly assigned
to a specific role, designated as player 1, player 2, or player 3. Each subject remained in the same
role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period, each player was endowed with
e1 = e2 = e3 = 100 experimental francs and was randomly regrouped with two other players to
form a three-player group, with each player in a different role. Player 1 made a decision on how
many francs between 0 and 100 to send to player 2 and how many francs to keep. Each franc sent
by player 1 was tripled (k1 = 3). After players 2 and 3 learned the amount of francs sent by player
1, player 2 then made a decision on how many francs to send to player 3. The amount sent by
player 2 was also tripled (k2 = 3). Finally, player 3 made a decision on how many francs to send
back to player 1, how many francs to send back to player 2, and how many francs to keep. All
subjects were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send some, all, or none of the francs
6

available to them. At the end of each period, the amounts sent and returned by all players were
reported for everyone to see. Instructions, available in Appendix I, explain the structure of the
game in detail.
We applied the same design to the C treatment except that, after player 1 made his
decision, player 2 and player 3 were able to communicate for 90 seconds in a text based “chat
room”. Communication took place only after players 2 and 3 learned the decision made by player
1. Subjects were told that only players 2 and 3 would see the messages. In sending messages
back and forth, we requested subjects to be civil to each other and not to reveal their identities.
Previous studies have shown that subjects care about treating others fairly (Fehr and
Gachter, 2000), they display trust and trustworthiness contrary to self-interested profitmaximizing behavior (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1998), they are concerned about
efficiency (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), and they have unconditional other-regarding
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox, 2004). In evolutionary
literature it is found that people exhibit direct and indirect trust in other people (Buchner et al.,
2004; Greiner and Levati, 2005).4 Based on these observations we conjecture that players 1 and 2
will trust player 3 by sending positive amounts. It is also documented in a two-player trust game
that the levels of direct trust and reciprocity are higher than the levels of indirect trust and
reciprocity (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Seinen

4

Greiner and Levati (2005) use a variant of a trust game in order to implement a cyclical network of indirect
reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help the third, and so on until the last, who in
turn may help the first. Like in a two-player trust game, the authors find that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual
trust in the multi-player environment. Buchner et al. (2004) compare the trust-reciprocity regimes with the explicit
incentive schemes in the context of a 3-person ultimatum game. They find that mutual trust is as good as incentive
contracts in inducing costly actions by employees.
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and Schram, 2006).5 Therefore, we expect that player 2 will trust more than player 1. And player
3 will reciprocate to player 2 more than to player 1.
We base our hypothesis of the effects of communication in the multi-level trust game on
previous findings in the communication literature. Several experimental studies of one-shot twoplayer trust games show that cheap talk communication increases cooperation between trustor
and trustee (Glaeser et al., 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Buchan et al., 2006; Ben-Ner
et al., 2009).6 Communication also improves cooperation in prisoner dilemma games (Wichman,
1972), public good games (Isaac and Walker, 1988), common-pool resource games (Hackett et
al., 1994), and voting experiments (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996; Zhang, 2009). Social
psychologists have identified several means by which communication can increase cooperation:
communication creates group identity, thus improving group welfare, and communication elicits
commitments, creating a promise-keeping norm (Bornstein 1992, Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland
1994 and Bicchieri 2002). In our multi-level trust game communication occurs between players 2
and 3. Thus, players 2 and 3 should identify each other as in-group members, while categorizing
player 1 as an out-group. According to social identity theory, group members tend to favor the

5

Dufwenberg et al. (2001) perform an experiment based on a trust game with direct and indirect reciprocity
treatments. By allowing receivers to reciprocate towards the other donors, they find that indirect reciprocity induces
only insignificantly smaller donations than direct reciprocity and that receivers are more rewarding in the case of
indirect reciprocity. Guth et al. (2001) find that indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation compared
to the direct reward. In the same line of research, Seinen and Schram (2006) and Wedekind and Milinski (2000)
provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in “repeated helping game” developed by Nowak and
Sigmund (1998). In this game, donors decide whether or not to provide costly help to the recipients they are matched
with, based on information about the recipient’s behavior in encounters with third parties.
6
Ben-Ner et al. (2009) find that trust and trustworthiness are increased when verbal communication is allowed.
Similarly, Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) find that verbal communication helps subjects to reach agreement even
without visual or auditory contact. In these two studies, two-way communication is implemented. That is, both
trustor and trustee can exchange pre-play messages. Glaeser et al. (2000) permit face to face communication before
playing trust games. They find that when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness increase.
They conclude that trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the
experiments. Buchan et al. (2006) allow subjects to engage in personal but not task-relevant communication before
playing trust games and find significant increase of trust and trustworthiness. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
allow either trustor or trustee, but not both, to send free-form messages in a binary trust game. They find that the
messages sent by trustees increase both trust and trustworthiness. However, no such effect is found when only
trustors can send messages.
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in-group at the expense of the out-group members. This finding is supported by many social
psychology experiments. 7 Therefore, one should expect that with communication, player 2
exhibits more trust, by sending more to player 3, and player 3 exhibits more trustworthiness to
player 2, by sending back larger proportions of his endowment. On the other hand, the out-group
player 1 should contribute less to player 2 considering the possible collusion formed between
players 2 and 3 via communication.
To test the conjectures raised in this study, we conducted an experiment which involved
72 undergraduate student subjects from Purdue University. The computerized experimental
sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran two NC-C sessions, in which a total
of 36 subjects were engaged in 10 interactions with no communication and then 10 interactions
with communication. The other 36 subjects participated in two C-NC sessions, where we
reversed the order of the treatments.8 After completing all 20 decision periods, 4 periods were
randomly selected for payment (2 periods for each treatment). The earnings were converted into
US dollars at the rate of 100 francs to $1. On average, subjects earned $16 each and the
experiment session lasted for about 90 minutes.

4. Results
Table 4.1 summarizes the average amount sent and the profit earned by all players in the
C and NC treatments. Among three players, player 1 earned the lowest profit while player 3
earned the highest profit in the experiment. In line with our conjecture, players 1 and 2 trust
player 3 by sending significant amounts in the NC treatment. Moreover, the level of indirect trust
exhibited by player 1, which is represented by 43 francs sent to player 2 (43% of income), is
7

Social identity theory was first developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979). Chen and Li (2009) provide a detailed
review of the literature.
8
Two sessions (one NC-C and one C-NC) had 12 subjects and two other sessions had 24 subjects.
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lower than the level of direct trust by player 2, which is represented by 117 francs sent to player
3 (52% of income). Based on the estimation of a random effect model, where the dependent
variable is the amount sent and the independent variable is a player type dummy, the difference
is significant in absolute terms (p-value < 0.01) but it is not significant in relative to income
terms (p-value = 0.29).9
Table 4.1– Summary of Average Amount Sent and Profit
Share of
Income Sent
Player
NC
C
NC
C
P1 to P2
43 (42)
69 (41)
0.43 (0.42) 0.69 (0.41) P1
P2 to P3 117 (131) 256 (152) 0.52 (0.45) 0.84 (0.33) P2
P3 to P1
65 (161) 154 (185) 0.10 (0.19) 0.13 (0.15) P3
P3 to P2
90 (160) 274 (205) 0.14 (0.19) 0.29 (0.18)
Standard deviations are in parentheses
Decision

Amount Sent

Profit
NC
121
202
296

C
185
324
441

Share of
Total Profit
NC
C
0.20 0.20
0.33 0.34
0.48 0.46

Table 4.2 – Communication Treatment Effects
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
Amount Sent
Amount Sent Relative to Income
Dependent variable
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
C-treatment
25.6**
139.3**
89.6**
183.8**
0.26**
0.32**
0.04**
0.16**
[1 if treatment is C]
(3.2)
(11.9)
(14.4)
(15.9)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.02)
Constant
43.1**
116.8**
64.5**
89.7**
0.43**
0.52**
0.10**
0.13**
(5.1)
(14.3)
(18.0)
(16.6)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
In each regression we control for period, subject, and session effects
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects

Regression

(1)
RE

The main question posed in this study is the direct and indirect effects of communication
on a multi-level trust game. Table 4.2 reports the estimation results of random effects models,
where the dependent variable is the amount sent and the independent variable is a treatment
dummy. As we expected, when communication is allowed, player 2 exhibits more trust in player

9

We use pooled data from C-NC and NC-C sessions in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. The order effect does not prevent
us from drawing the conclusion that communication has significant effects on trusting behavior in our experiment.
By using data only from the first treatment in each session (first 10 periods from C-NC and NC-C sessions) we
receive very similar and statistically significant estimates as in Table 4.2.
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3. The average amount sent by player 2 is increased by 139 francs (specification 2). Controlling
for the amount player 2 received from player 1, in the NC treatment player 2 sends only 52% of
income to player 3 while this amount is increased by 32% in the C treatment (specification 6).
How does communication affect the behavior of player 3? Table 4.1 shows that in the
NC treatment, player 3 returns 77% back to player 2 of the amount player 2 sent to player 3.
When communication is introduced, player 3 returns 107% back to player 2. The same
conclusion can be drawn about the behavior of player 3 towards player 1. With communication,
player 3 sends higher absolute and relative amounts back to player 1. The two panels in Figure
4.1 show that the distribution of return ratio is shifted towards more generous behavior of player
3 in the C treatment as compared to the NC treatment. These findings provide full support for the
conjecture that communication enhances trust and trustworthiness.
Figure 4.1 – Distribution of Return Ratio in the NC and C Treatments
Fraction
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Although only players 2 and 3 are allowed to communicate, we find that the amount
player 1 sends to player 2 in the C treatment is increased by 60% (Table 4.1). In relative terms,
player 1 sends 43% of income to player 2 in the NC treatment and 69% in the C treatment. This
result is contrary to our prior conjecture that the trust level of player 1 would fall in the C
11

treatment because communication would serve as a collusion device between players 2 and 3. In
fact, we find evidence that communication increases the collusion between players 2 and 3. In
the C treatment, player 3 sends half of his income to player 2 and nothing to player 1 in around
10% of the instances. In the NC treatment, this number is less than 1%, indicating much lower
collusion. Then the question is why would communication increase the trust level of player 1?
The answer turns out to be very simple. In the NC treatment, player 3 splits the income equally
between three players around 5% of the instances. In the C treatment, this rate is around 25%.
Therefore, in the C treatment, player 1 receives 140% more than in the NC treatment. This
means that communication has two opposite effects on the amount player 3 sends to player 1: it
enhances collusion between players 2 and 3, and it also activates fairness norms and thus
increases cooperation between all players. 10 The cooperation effect dominates the collusion
effect, which is supported by estimation of specifications (3) and (7) in Table 4.2.
As a result of communication, all players earn higher payoffs. In the C treatment, the
sum of total earnings is around 950, while it is 619 in the NC treatment (Table 4.1).11 Therefore,
the efficiency in the NC treatment is 48% (619/1300), while in the C treatment it is 73%
(950/1300). Communication also results in more equal split of earnings between players 2 and 3.
In the NC treatment the difference between earnings of players 2 and 3 is around 15%, while in
the C treatment this difference is around 12%.
We conducted a C-NC session to see whether cooperation which subjects have achieved
during the communication treatment could be sustained when communication is removed.
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b display the time trend of average amount sent by all players. Figure 4.2a
suggests that communication in the C treatment indeed influences the behavior of players in the
7

Cason and Mui (1997) also documents that communication makes groups more altruistic than individuals in a
dictator game.
11
Based on the estimation of random effect models, where the dependent variable is the profit and the independent
variable is a treatment dummy, the differences in payoffs are significant (p-value < 0.01).
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consecutive NC treatment. The average amount sent by each player in the NC treatment is higher
in C-NC session (Figure 4.2a) than in NC-C session (Figure 4.2b). However, this difference is
significant only for the first 5 periods based on the estimation results of a random effect model.
Figure 4.2a – Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in C-NC Order
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Figure 4.2b – Average Amount Sent Over the Periods in NC-C Order
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To further account for order effects, Table 4.3 reports random effects regressions of the
amount all players sent on treatment and order variables. The variable C-treatment x NC-C is
equal to 1 if treatment is C and the order in which treatments were run is NC-C. The variable C13

treatment x C-NC is equal to 1 if treatment is C and the order in which treatments were run is CNC. The p-values at the bottom of Table 4.3 indicate that order has a significant effect on the
behavior of all players.12 In particular, communication is more effective in NC-C sessions than in
C-NC sessions. A possible explanation is that in NC-C sessions, after 10 periods of the NC
treatment, subjects understand better the efficiency cost of poor cooperation, and thus they
significantly increase cooperation in the following C treatment.
Table 4.3 – Order Effect
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
RE
Amount Sent
Amount Sent Relative to Income
Dependent variable
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
P1 to P2 P2 to P3 P3 to P1 P3 to P2
C-treatment x NC-C
37.6**
178.1** 127.7** 228.8**
0.38**
0.41**
0.06**
0.18**
[1 if C treatment and NC-C session]
(4.3)
(16.0)
(19.4)
(21.0)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
C-treatment x C-NC
13.7**
100.4**
51.4**
138.8**
0.14**
0.23**
0.02
0.14**
[1 if C treatment and C-NC session]
(4.3)
(16.0)
(19.4)
(21.0)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Constant
43.1**
116.8**
64.5**
89.7**
0.43**
0.52**
0.10**
0.13**
(5.2)
(14.6)
(18.3)
(16.9)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.02)
p-value
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.001
0.000
0.002
0.105
0.130
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
In each regression we control for period, subject, and session effects
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects
Regression

(1)
RE

5. Beliefs and Messages
5.1 Beliefs
In both C and NC treatments, after making the decision on how much to send to player 2,
we asked player 1 to make a prediction about the actions of players 2 and 3 before seeing the
outcome screen. Player 1 was asked to guess how much player 2 would send to player 3, how
much player 3 would send back to player 2, and how much player 3 would send back to player 1.
Subjects were financially motivated to make correct predictions. They were paid 10 francs for
each prediction if the prediction differed by no more than 5% from the actual decision made. We
12

We used standard Wald test to see whether these two variables are significantly different from each other.
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chose this belief-elicitation protocol instead of the quadratic-scoring rule mainly because it is
simple and rather easy for subjects to understand. As argued by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), this form of belief elicitation sharpens the incentives in comparison with quadraticscoring rules.
Table 5.1– Summary of Average Expected Amount Sent and Percentage Difference

Decision
P2 to P3
P3 to P2
P3 to P1

Expected Amount
Sent
NC
C
133
265
130
287
101
229

Actual Amount
Sent
NC
C
117
256
90
274
65
154

Percentage Difference
From Actual Decisions
NC
C
13.9%
3.4%
45.4%
4.8%
56.2%
48.6%

Table 5.1 reports the average predictions of player 1 on the amounts sent by player 2 and
player 3 and the average percentage differences from the actual decisions made. On average
player 1 makes good predictions on the amount player 2 sends to player 3 in both treatments and
on the amount player 3 sends back to player 2 in the C treatment. However, in both C and NC
treatments, player 1 overestimates the amount player 3 sends back to players 1. 13 This
overestimation may partially explain the high level of trust exhibited by player 1 in the multilevel trust game.

5.2 Content Analysis of Communication
At this point we know that communication enhances cooperation in the group of three
people although only a subgroup of two people is allowed to communicate. This brings us to the
question of what kinds of messages cause this cooperation. We use content analysis to answer
this question.

13

We have also looked at this overestimation across periods and found that it does not disappear with experience.
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The procedure that we used to quantify the recorded messages is as follows. First, we
randomly selected a session to develop a coding scheme. We classified the messages into 18
categories, shown in Table 5.2. Then we employed two undergraduate students to code all
messages into the coding categories independently. The unit of observation for coding was all
messages sent out in a given period before subjects made decisions. Coders were asked not to
start coding until they had finished reading all messages in a given period. If a unit of
observation was deemed to contain the relevant category of content, it was coded as 1 and 0
otherwise. Each unit was coded under as many or few categories as the coders deemed
appropriate. The coders were not informed about any hypotheses of the study.14
Table 5.2 – Coding Table, Reliability Indexes, and Frequency of Coding

Category
1a
1b
1c
1d
1e
1f
1g
1h

Frequency
Cohen’s
p -value
Kappa K
of coding

Description
P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3
P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3
P2 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3
P2 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1
P2 made a negative comment about P1
P2 showed trust in P3
P2 used threat
P2 pleaded or appealed to P3

0.53
0.75
0.81
0.76
0.50
0.37
0.39
0.53

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

21.3%
17.9%
7.1%
2.7%
6.3%
4.2%
2.1%
9.4%

2a
2b
2c
2d
2e
2f
2g

P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3
P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3
P3 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3
P3 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1
P3 made a negative comment about P1
P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness
P3 mentioned about his or her good qualities

0.74
0.77
0.77
0.52
0.50
0.57
0.32

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

31.5%
24.2%
5.8%
4.6%
4.8%
6.3%
1.3%

3a
3b
3c

Agreement was reached on the first proposal
Agreement was reached on a different proposal than the first proposal
Agreement was not reached

0.70
0.67
0.00

0
0
0.53

74.8%
18.3%
0.4%

Following Neuendorf (2002), we adopt Cohen’s Kappa K as a reliability measurement of
the between-coder agreement. This measurement determines to which extent the coders agree
that a certain message belongs to a particular coding category. Cohen’s reliability measurement
14

The instructions for coders are attached in Appendix II.
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accounts for the between-coder agreement by chance (Hayes, 2005).15 Reliability K greater than
zero indicates that the proportion of agreements exceeds the proportion of agreements expected
by chance. According to Landis and Koch (1977), K between 0.4 and 0.6 corresponds to a
moderate agreement level and K greater than 0.6 corresponds to full agreement. Table 5.2
displays the coding scheme along with Cohen’s reliability indexes and the frequency of coding
for the C treatment. For the vast majority of categories, K is greater than 0.5. As a result of
infrequent coding there are few categories that have unsatisfactory agreement levels. In further
discussions of categories we use the average of the two independent codings. Specifically, the
value of coding is treated as 1 if two coders agree that a message belongs to a given category, 0
if two coders agree that a message does not belong to a given category and 0.5 if the two coders
disagree with each other.
Table 5.3 reports the estimation results of random effect models with individual subject
effects. The dependent variable is the amount sent by either player 2 or player 3 and the
independent variables are various categories of messages. In all regressions we control for period
and session effects. Specifications (1) and (2) indicate that player 2 sends more to player 3 and
player 3 reciprocates more to player 2 when either player 2 or player 3 proposes an equal split
between all players (categories 1b and 2b). Specification (1) also indicates that the more often
player 3 makes promises or shows his trustworthiness to player 2, the more player 2 sends to
player 3 (category 2f). Some typical quotes from player 3 are “send all yours, I’ll give you back
more. I promise I won’t screw you out of anything. You can trust me”, or “I’ll double your
money if you send me 100.” It is also important to note that the magnitude of this influence is
very high. When player 3 sends a message which falls into category 2f then player 2, on average,
sends an additional 72 francs to player 3. Player 3 also reciprocates by sending 99 francs more to
15

For binary 0 or 1 coding, agreement by chance is 50%.
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player 2.These findings are consistent with the argument made by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) that promises affect the behavior of both trustees and trustors, resulting in much higher
cooperation.
Table 5.3 – Random Effects Regressions on Categories of Messages
Regression
Dependent variable
1a
P2 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3
1b

P2 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3

1c

P2 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3

1d

P2 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1

1e

P2 made a negative comment about P1

1f

P2 made any promises or showed trust to P3

1g

P2 used threat

1h

P2 pleaded or appealed to P3

2a

P3 proposed to send nothing to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3

2b

P3 proposed (almost) equal split between P1, P2 and P3

2c

P3 proposed to send some to P1 and (almost) equal split between P2 and P3

2d

P3 made a positive comment or showed concern for well-being of P1

2e

P3 made a negative comment about P1

2f

P3 made any promises or showed trustworthiness

2g

P3 mentioned about his or her good qualities

(1)
RE

(2)
RE

(3)
RE

P2 to P3
-21.15
(25.24)
132.44***
(25.64)
36.07
(39.72)

P3 to P2
-25.56
(40.14)
75.37*
(39.51)
21.51
(53.97)

P3 to P1
-102.88***
(29.23)
141.70***
(29.35)
-49.39
(40.28)
-3.92
(59.56)
5.68
(44.21)

-20.5
(48.20)
-80.6
(70.95)
-58.99*
(32.54)
4.56
(21.41)
125.59***
(22.29)
50.84
(35.89)

87.57
(75.05)
-139.62
(104.88)
-53.11
(49.34)
-9.32
(36.32)
96.58***
(36.53)
88.4
(59.26)

72.44*
(38.83)
-20.96
(86.83)

99.33
(63.58)
33.28
(144.36)

-117.74***
(25.00)
150.07***
(26.01)
-2.14
(44.09)
22.16
(49.42)
-56.31
(38.52)

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In each regression we also control for period and session effects

Another interesting finding is that the more player 2 pleads or appeals to player 3, the less
player 2 sends to player 3. Some typical quotes from player 2 are “don’t screw me”, “don’t be
greedy”. Intuitively, player 2 who sends less to player 3 is the one who doesn’t trust player 3 in
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the first place. Therefore, pleads and appeals of player 2 may be revealing player 2’s not-trusting
type.
Finally, specification (3) indicates that when either player 2 or player 3 proposes to send
nothing to player 1 then player 3 sends significantly lower amounts to player 1 (categories 1a and
2a). On the other hand, when either player 2 or player 3 proposes an equal split between three
players then player 3 sends significantly higher amounts to player 1 (categories 1b and 2b).

6. Conclusion
This paper presents an experimental study of a novel multi-level trust game. In this game,
player 1 acts as a trustor, player 2 embodies characteristics of both trustor and trustee, and player
3 always acts as the trustee. We investigate the internal and external effects of communication on
direct and indirect trust and reciprocity. Although the multi-level trust game requires additional
layers of trust than the standard two-player trust game, we still find a substantial level of direct
and indirect trust in the multi-level trust game even when there is no communication. Consistent
with other studies, we find that the level of direct trust and reciprocity is higher than the level of
indirect trust and reciprocity.
Regarding communication, we find that players 2 and 3 who are engaged in nonbinding
communication exhibit more trust and trustworthiness. The most unexpected and positive result
of our experiment is the effect communication has on player 1’s behavior. Although only players
2 and 3 are allowed to communicate, we find that player 1’s trust increases by 60%. This is
because communication activates stronger preference for fairness than collusion between players
2 and 3. Expecting that, player 1 exhibits more trust in players 2 and 3. In response, player 3
sends higher absolute and relative amounts back to player 1. Belief elicitation reveals that player
19

1 persistently overestimates the trustworthiness of player 3, which might account for the high
level of trust exhibited by player 1 in the communication treatment. We also find that the social
norms developed during the communication stage carry over to the no communication stage.
However, the difference disappears after 5 periods of play.
Finally, we use content analysis to study what kinds of messages enhance cooperation. In
the multivariate analysis of communication, we find that the messages that significantly increase
cooperation between players 2 and 3 are the ones that indicate player 3’s trustworthiness, and
messages that indicate willingness to split all earnings equally.
Our study provides evidence that economic agents exhibit direct and indirect trust in
multi-level interactions among strangers. One mechanism that can further promote trust and
reciprocity is communication even when only a subgroup of the economic agents can afford to
communicate with each other. Since communication between insiders may raise the concerns of
forming collusion at the cost of the outsiders, to better use this mechanism, insiders should
deliver the idea that communication activates more fairness norms toward the outsiders. This
suggests that to rebuild trust with individual investors in FoFs, managers have to send clear
signals to investors that their interests of obtaining cooperative, fair and efficient outcomes from
the investment are perfectly aligned.
The findings of our experiment can also explain the emergence of many web-based
auctions and other forms of online businesses which are built on trust and reciprocity among
strangers (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). For example, in the wholesale eBay online auction, as
a consumer wholesale distributor, you can buy products at an unbeatable wholesale price from
suppliers and then set your sale price in online auctions. A good reputation on fair trade between
you and the wholesale suppliers helps to attract more buyers.
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Appendix I – The Instructions for the Experiment
Treatment (NC-C)
INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision making. Various research
agencies have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make
appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is francs.
Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ francs to one dollar. At the end of today’s experiment,
you will be paid in private and in cash. 24 participants are in today’s experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk,
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your
cooperation.
The experiment is composed of 2 parts. Each part consists of 10 decision making periods. At this time we
proceed to Part 1 of the experiment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
The first part of the experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The 24 participants will be
randomly assigned into 8 three-person groups. In addition to the group assignment each participant will also be
randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, designated as Person 1, Person 2, and Person 3. You will remain
in the same type throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with
two other participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group.
The following diagram shows how this part of the experiment proceeds:

Stage 1
Person 1 can send to Person
2 any amount X between 0
and 100 francs

amount X sent
by Person 1 is
multiplied by 3

Stage 3

Stage 2
Person 2 can send to Person 3
any amount Y between 0 and
100 + 3X francs

amount Y sent
by Person 2 is
multiplied by 3

Person 3 can send back to Person 1
and/or Person 2 any amount
between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs
During each period, you and the other two participants in your group will make choices which will
determine your payoffs. Each period is comprised of three stages. At Stage 1 Person 1 can send to Person 2 any
amount X between 0 and 100 francs. Amount X sent by Person 1 is multiplied by 3. At Stage 2 Person 2 can send to
Person 3 any amount Y between 0 and 100 + 3X francs. Amount Y sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. At Stage 3
Person 3 can send back to Person 1 and/or Person 2 any amount between 0 and 100 + 3Y francs.
More specifically, Person 1, 2 and 3 are given the initial of 100 francs in their individual accounts. At
Stage 1 Person 1 makes a decision how many francs to send to Person 2 and how many francs to allocate to his or
her individual account, as shown on the screen below.
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Allocation to the
individual account

Allocation to
Person 2

Decision Screen for Person 1 at Stage 1
Person 1 has the opportunity to send any number of francs between 0 and 100 to Person 2’s account. Each
franc sent by Person 1 is multiplied by 3. For example, if Person 1 sends 40 francs to Person 2, the amount received
by Person 2 is 120 francs (40×3=120). At the end of Stage 1 Person 2 and 3 learn the decision made by Person 1 and
the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts.
At Stage 2 Person 2 will then decide how many francs to send to Person 3 and how many francs to
allocate to his or her individual account. Person 2 can send any amount of francs available in his/her account at that
time. Each franc sent by Person 2 is multiplied by 3. For example, if Person 2 sends 60 francs, the amount received
by Person 3 is 180 francs (60×3=180). At the end of Stage 2 Person 3 and 1 learn the decisions made by Person 2
and the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts.
The decision screen for Person 2 is as following:
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Allocation to the
individual account

Allocation to
Person 3

Decision Screen for Person 2 at Stage 2
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how many francs to send
back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account as shown in the following screen:

Allocation to the
individual account

Allocation to
Person 1

Allocation to
Person 2

Decision Screen for Person 3
Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the total period earnings and the decisions of all three participants in the
group made at each stage are reported to each person as shown in the outcome screen below:
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Outcome Screen
Once the outcome screen is displayed, please record your results for the period on your record sheet under
the appropriate heading.
IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. All three Persons in
the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs available to them. You will remain in the
same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two
other participants to from a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual payment in Part 1
using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your record sheet.
Are there any questions?

PREDICTIONS BY PERSON 1 (This part of the instructions was given only to person 1)
You are assigned to be Person 1. After you make your decision in Stage 1, you will be asked to enter three
predictions in Stage 2: prediction about how many francs will Person 2 send to Person 3, prediction about how many
francs will Person 3 send back to Person 2, and prediction about how many francs will Person 3 send back to you. In
addition to your earnings from the individual account you will be paid for the number of correct predictions you
make. In particular, at the end of the period, we will look at the choices actually made by Person 2 and 3 you are
paired with and compare their choices to your predictions. You will be paid 10 francs for each prediction if your
prediction differs by no more than 5 percent from the actual decision made. If your prediction differs by more than 5
percent from the actual decision made, you will receive 0 francs for that prediction.
The decision screen for prediction is as following:
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How many francs do you predict
Person 2 will send to Person 3?
How many francs do you predict
Person 3 will send back to Person 2?
How many francs do you predict
Person 3 will send back to you?

Note that since your prediction is made before you know what actual decisions are made by Person 2 and
Person 3 you are paired with, you maximize the expected size of your prediction payoff by simply stating your true
beliefs about what you think Person 2 and Person 3 will do. Any other prediction will decrease the amount you can
expect to earn from your prediction payoff.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for Part 2 are exactly
the same as the rules for Part 1.
The only difference is that in this part of the experiment, after Stage 1, Person 2 and Person 3 will have an
opportunity to communicate with each other in a chat window. The communication will take place only after Person
2 and 3 have learned the decision made by Person 1. Person 2 and 3 will have 90 seconds to chat with each other
anonymously. Although we will record the messages, only Person 2 and 3 will see them. Note, in sending messages
back and forth we request that you follow two simple rules: (1) Be civil to each other and use no profanity and (2)
Do not identify yourself.
After the chat period is over, at Stage 2 Person 2 will decide how many francs to send to Person 3 and
how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account. At the end of Stage 2 Person 3 and 1 learn the
decisions made by Person 2 and the total amount of francs in all three individual accounts.
At Stage 3 Person 3 will then decide how many francs to send back to Person 1, how many francs to send
back to Person 2, and how many francs to allocate to his or her individual account.
Finally, at the end of the Stage 3 the earnings for all three participants in the group are reported to each
person. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading.
IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. All three Persons in
the group have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of the francs available to them. You will remain in the
same role throughout the experiment. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly re-grouped with two
other participants to from a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 2 of the 10 periods for actual payment in Part 2
using dice roll (ten-sided die with numbers from 1 to 10). You will sum the total earnings for these 2 periods and
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment, as shown on the last page of your record sheet.
Are there any questions?
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Appendix II – Instructions for Coders
Coding Instructions

Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game.
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment.
Coding Rules:
(1) The unit of observation is all messages in a given period. You should not start to code
until you finish reading all messages in a given period. It is very important to look at the
context of the messages across lines to properly interpret and code them.
(2) If a unit of observation is deemed to contain the relevant category of content, enter the
code for the category in the relevant column beside the first line of the unit.
(3) Each unit can be coded under as many or few categories as you deem appropriate. Enter
the additional codes in columns to the right.
(4) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which
statements should fall into which categories.
(5) Your job is to capture what had been said rather than why it was said or what effect it
had. Think of yourself as a “coding machine.”
(6) Code the sessions in the chronological order that the sessions were conducted, as
explained and presented by your coding supervisor.
Please track the time you spend on coding the messages and training. You will be paid $12 for
each hour working on this project.
Thanks a lot for your participation in the coding task!
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